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Abstract
In this paper we consider the secure transmission in fast Rayleigh fading channels with full knowledge of
the main channel and only the statistics of the eavesdropper’s channel state information at the transmitter. For
the multiple-input, single-output, single-antenna eavesdropper systems, we generalize Goel and Negi’s celebrated
artificial-noise (AN) assisted beamforming, which just selects the directions to transmit AN heuristically. Our scheme
may inject AN to the direction of the message, which outperforms Goel and Negi’s scheme where AN is only
injected in the directions orthogonal to the main channel. The ergodic secrecy rate of the proposed AN scheme can
be represented by a highly simplified power allocation problem. To attain it, we prove that the optimal transmission
scheme for the message bearing signal is a beamformer, which is aligned to the direction of the legitimate channel.
After characterizing the optimal eigenvectors of the covariance matrices of signal and AN, we also provide the
necessary condition for transmitting AN in the main channel to be optimal. Since the resulting secrecy rate is
a non-convex power allocation problem, we develop an algorithm to efficiently solve it. Simulation results show
that our generalized AN scheme outperforms Goel and Negi’s, especially when the quality of legitimate channel
is much worse than that of eavesdropper’s. In particular, the regime with non-zero secrecy rate is enlarged, which
can significantly improve the connectivity of the secure network when the proposed AN assisted beamforming is
applied.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In a wiretap channel, a source node wishes to transmit confidential messages securely to a legitimate
receiver and to keep the eavesdropper as ignorant of the message as possible. As a special case of the
broadcast channels with confidential messages [1], Wyner [2] characterized the secrecy capacity of the
discrete memoryless wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity is the largest rate communicated between the
source and destination nodes with the eavesdropper knowing no information of the messages. Motivated
by the demand of high data rate transmission and improving the connectivity of the network [3], the
multiple antenna systems with security concern are considered by several authors. With full channel
state information at the transmitter (CSIT), Shafiee and Ulukus [4] first proved the secrecy capacity of
a Gaussian channel with two-input, two-output, single-antenna-eavesdropper. Then the authors of [5]–[7]
extended the secrecy capacity to the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), multiple-antenna-
eavesdropper channel using different techniques. On the other hand, due to the characteristics of wireless
channels, the impacts of fading channels on the secrecy transmission were considered in [5], [8] with full
CSIT. Considering practical issues such as the limited bandwidth of the feedback channels or the speed
of the channel estimation at the receiver, the perfect CSIT may not be available. Therefore, several works
considered the secrecy transmission with partial CSIT [9]–[13]. In [9]–[11], the authors naively chose the
directions of signal and AN without optimization and the resulting performance is suboptimal. In addition,
they solved the power allocation via full search, which is inefficient. Furthermore, they did not prove the
equality of the power constraint is hold (using all power is optimal). In [12], a single antenna system
is considered, thus the authors did not solve the beamformer and power allocation problems. Also, the
authors did not prove the rate increases with increasing total power. In [13], the authors did not consider
the AN in the transmission, and thus their scheme is a special case of ours. Indeed, as shown in [9], [11],
adding AN in transmission is crucial in increasing the secrecy rate in fading wiretap channels. Also under
the case that the main channel is fully known at transmitter, the optimal direction for signals is not solved
analytically in [13]. However, the secrecy capacities for channels with partial CSIT are known only for
some limited cases, i.e., the transmitter has single antenna with block fading [10] and only the statistics
3of both the main and eavesdropper’s channels are known at the transmitter [14].
In this paper, we consider an important type of wiretap channels with partial CSIT, namely, the multiple-
input single-output single-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOSE) fading wiretap channels. We assume that the
main channel has a constant channel gain and the eavesdropper channel is fast faded, respectively. We
also assume that the transmitter has perfect knowledge of the main channel and only the statistics of the
eavesdropper channel. We adopt the artificial noise (AN) assisted secure beamforming as our transmission
scheme, where the AN is used to disrupt the eavesdropper’s reception [11] [9]. Although the secrecy
capacity of the considered channel is unknown, the performance of the AN-assisted beamforming has
been shown to be capacity-achieving in the high signal to noise ratio (SNR) regime when the transmitter
is equipped with a large number of antennas [11]. However, in other operation regimes, the heuristically
selected directions in [11] [9] to transmit AN may not be optimal, where the AN is restricted to be in
the null space of the legitimate channel. This motivates our study on optimizing the AN assisted secure
beamforming. Note that the assumption that the statistics of the eavesdropper’s channel are known at
transmitter was also used in [9] to design the power allocation between the signal and the AN (see [9,
(8)]). Thus our comparison to the method in [9] in Section V is reasonable and fair.
The main contribution of our paper is that we propose a general AN scheme, which outperforms [9].
More specifically, the optimal AN may be full rank under some channel conditions rather than low rank,
as restricted in [9]. In addition, we provide a simplified power allocation problem to describe the ergodic
secrecy rate, which highly reduces the complexity of solving the rate. To attain it, we characterize the
optimal beamforming directions and the power allocation strategies for AN. We also provide the necessary
condition for transmitting AN in the main channel to be optimal. After characterizing the eigenvectors
of the covariance matrices of signal and AN, the resulting rate becomes a non-convex power allocation
problem and we develop an algorithm to efficiently solve it. Simulation results confirm that the full-rank
AN provides rate gains over [9], especially through the enlarged non-zero rate region. Note that the secure
connectivity in a network is assured by the non-zero secrecy rate of the transmitter-receiver pairs [3]. Thus
our scheme is very useful for the large scale wireless network applications, which is an important type
4of applications of the MISOSE wiretap channels [3].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the considered system model.
In Section III an intuitive explanation of the rate gain from the proposed scheme is provided. We then
develop our main result, i.e., the ergodic secrecy rate, via three steps. In this section we also provide the
necessary condition to have a full rank optimal covariance matrix of AN. In Section IV, we provide an
iterative algorithm to solve the power allocation problem. In Section V we demonstrate the simulation
results. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, lower and upper case bold alphabets denote vectors and matrices, respectively. The
superscript (.)H denotes the transpose complex conjugate. |A| and |a| represent the determinant of the
square matrix A and the absolute value of the scalar variable a, respectively. A diagonal matrix whose
diagonal entries are a1 . . .ak is denoted by diag(a1 . . .ak). The trace of A is denoted by tr(A). We define
C(x), log(1+x) and (x)+ ,max{0, x}. A⊥ is the null space of A. The mutual information between two
random variables is denoted by I(;). In denotes the n by n identity matrix. A≻ 0 and A 0 denote that
A is a positive definite and positive semi-definite matrix, respectively. a≻ b denotes a majorizes b.
We consider the MISOSE system as shown in Fig. 1, where the transmitter (Alice) has nT antennas and
the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) each has single antenna. The received signals at
Bob and Eve can be respectively represented as
yk = hHxk +n1,k, (1)
zk = gHk xk +n2,k, (2)
where xk ∈ CnT×1 is the transmit vector, k is the time index, h is the constant main channel vector,
gk ∼CN(0,InT ) is the random eavesdropper’s channel, and n1,k and n2,k are circularly symmetric complex
additive white Gaussian noises with variances one at Bob and Eve, respectively. In this system model,
we assume that full CSI of the legitimate channel and only the statistics of Eve’s channel are known at
transmitter. Without loss of generality, in the following we omit the time index to simplify the notation.
5The perfect secrecy and secrecy capacity are defined as follows. Consider a (2nR,n)-code with an
encoder that maps the message w ∈ W = {1,2, . . . ,2nR} into a length-n codeword, and a decoder at the
legitimate receiver that maps the received sequence yn (the collections of y over code length n) from the
MISOSE channels (1) to an estimated message wˆ ∈W . We then have the following definition of secrecy
capacity.
Definition 1 (Secrecy Capacity [10]): Perfect secrecy is achievable with rate R if, for any positive ε
and ε′, there exists a sequence of (2nR,n)-codes and an integer n0 such that for any n > n0
I(w;zn,hn,gn)/n < ε,and Pr(wˆ 6= w) ≤ ε′, (3)
where w is the secret message, zn, hn, and gn are the collections of z, h, and g over code length n,
respectively. The secrecy capacity Cs is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates.
From Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s argument [1], we know that the general secrecy capacity can be represented
by
C = max
p(x|u), p(u)
I(u;y)− I(u;z|g). (4)
However, for our considered CSIT setting, which is not full CSIT, the optimal p(x|u) and p(u) are still
unknown. We propose to apply the linear channel prefixing and Gaussian signaling to f (x|u) as
x = u+v, (5)
where u∼CN(0,Su) and v∼CN(0,Sv) are independent vectors to convey the message and AN, respec-
tively. In addition, the feasible channel input matrices of signal and AN belong to the set
S = {(Su,Sv) : tr(Su +Sv)≤ PT ,Su  0,Sv  0}. (6)
Substituting (1), (2), and (5) into (4), we have the ergodic secrecy rate with generalized AN (GAN) as
RGAN = max
Su,Sv∈S
(
log
(
1+hH (Su +Sv)h
1+hHSvh
)
−E
[
log
(
1+gH (Su +Sv)g
1+gHSvg
)])+
. (7)
Note that we do not limit the covariance matrix Sv of the AN v to have any special structure besides
the conventional one (6). Thus our GAN scheme generalizes the AN in [9], which is only allowed to
6be transmitted in the null space of the main channel. On the contrary, our GAN can be transmitted in
all possible directions. We then solve the ergodic secrecy rate optimization problem (7) for the proposed
GAN beamforming (GAN-BF) scheme in the following sections.
III. OPTIMIZATION OF THE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
In this section, we identify the structure of the optimal solutions S∗u and S∗v for the GAN-BF optimization
problem (7), where AN is not restricted in the null space of the main channel. By exploiting the optimal
structure, we transform the complicated optimization problem over the covariance matrices (7) as a much
simpler one in Theorem 1. In the following Theorem 1, the optimized ergodic secrecy rate of the GAN-BF
is merely characterized by the power allocations among the message bearing signal, AN in the direction
of the main channel, and AN in the directions orthogonal to the main channel.
Theorem 1: For the MISOSE fast fading wiretap channel with the perfect information of the legitimate
channel h, and only the statistics of the eavesdropper’s channel g∼CN(0,InT ) known at the transmitter,
the optimization of the secrecy rate in (7) can be reduced to the following optimization problem
RGAN = max
PU ,PV1 ,PV2 :
PU+PV1+(nT−1)PV2=PT

log
(
1+
||h||2PU
1+ ||h||2PV1
)
−E

log

1+ ˜G1PU
1+ ˜G1PV1 +
(
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi
)
PV2






+
,
(8)
where PU , PV1 , and, PV2 are the powers of the signal, the AN in the main channel, and the AN in the null
space of the main channel, respectively. ˜Gi , |gi|2 ∼ EXP(1), which is the exponential distribution with
mean equal to 1, for i = 1,2, . . . ,nT .
Comparing (7) to (8) we can easily find that the optimization problem is vastly simplified from solving
two matrices to three scalar variables. Note that we divide the proof of Theorem 1 into three parts for
the tractability and each part corresponds to Theorem 2, Lemma 3, and Lemma 4, respectively. Before
proving (8), we introduce two important lemmas to proceed.
Lemma 1: Given a diagonal matrix D = diag(d1, d2, · · · , dn)∈Cn×n. Assume d1 ≥ d2 ≥ ·· · ≥ dn and U
is unitary. Then U = [h/||h||, h⊥/||h||] and U = [h⊥/||h||, h/||h||] maximizes and minimizes hHUDUHh,
7respectively.
Proof: We can rewrite the maximization problem in the statement of the lemma as
max
n
∑
i=1
di|˜hi|2, s.t.
n
∑
i=1
|˜hi|2 = ||h||2, (9)
where ˜h = UHh, ˜hi is the ith entry of ˜h. Then it can be easily seen that |˜h1| = ||h|| with |˜h2| = |˜h3| =
· · · = |˜hn| = 0 can optimize (9). Therefore, it is clear that U = [h/||h||, h⊥/||h||]. The minimization part
can be proved similarly.
Now, we identify the eigenvectors of the optimal S∗u and S∗v through the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The optimal covariance matrices of the signal and AN S∗u and S∗v for (7) have the same
eigenvectors as [h/||h||, h⊥/||h||].
Proof: Assume Su +Sv and Sv are eigen-decomposed as UD1UH and VD2VH , respectively. First, we
can reform (14) as
max
Su,Sv
R = max
D1,D2
max
U,V
R = max
D1,D2
max
U,V
(
log
(
1+hHUD1UHh
1+hHVD2VHh
)
−E
[
log
(
1+gHUD1UHg
1+gHVD2VHg
)])+
. (10)
Since g is isotropically distributed,
E
[
log
(
1+gHUD1UHg
1+gHVD2VHg
)]
= E
[
log
(
1+gHD1g
1+gHD2g
)]
,
which is independent of U and V. Thus the inner optimization problem on the right hand side (RHS) of
(10) becomes
(U∗, V∗) = argmax
U,V
log
(
1+hHUD1UHh
1+hHVD2VHh
)
. (11)
Then from Lemma 1 we know that U = ΠU[h/||h||, h⊥/||h||] and V = ΠV[h/||h||, h⊥/||h||] can simulta-
neously maximize and minimize the numerator and denominator, respectively, where ΠU and ΠV are the
permutation matrices such that the eigenvector h/||h|| is in the direction of the maximum and minimum
entries of D1 and D2, respectively. Therefore, R is maximized. As a result, Su and Sv have the same
eigenvectors.
We then introduce the interlacing theorem in Lemma 3 [15, p.182] which will be used in proving
beamforming is optimal (Theorem 2).
8Lemma 3 (Interlacing theorem): Let M∈Cn×n be a Hermitian matrix and let a∈Cn be a given vector.
We then have
(a) λk(M±aaH)≤ λk+1(M)≤ λk+2(M±aaH), k = 1,2, . . . ,n−2, (12)
(b) λk(M)≤ λk+1(M±aaH)≤ λk+2(M), k = 1,2, . . . ,n−2, (13)
where λk(A) is the kth eigenvalue of A in ascending order.
First, we identify the rank property of the optimal Su∗.
Theorem 2: For the MISOSE fast fading wiretap channel with the perfect information of the legitimate
channel h, and only the statistics of the eavesdropper channel g ∼CN(0,InT ) known at the transmitter,
with the proposed GAN-BF, the optimal covariance matrix of signal for (7) is S∗u = PU||h||2 hhH .
Proof: Since the secrecy rate optimization problem (7) is non-convex, we can use the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions to find the necessary conditions for the optimal solutions. We first transform
(7) into the following form to simplify the KKT conditions
RGAN =
(
max
Su,Sv∈S
log
(
1+hH (Su +Sv)h
1+hHSvh
)
−E
[
log
(
1+gH (Su +Sv)g
1+gHSvg
)])+
. (14)
Compared with (7), in (14), we place the maximum inside the operation (.)+. The equivalence of (7) and
(14) comes from the fact that we can represent RGAN by range of the objective inside ()+ in (7) as the
union of the sets of positive and negative rates R+ and R−, respectively, as RGAN = max(R+
⋃
R−)+ =
max(R+, R−)+, which is max(R+) when R+ is a nonempty set and zero, otherwise. On the other hand,
(max(R+
⋃
R−))+ is also max(R+) when R+ is a nonempty set and zero, otherwise. Thus we know (7)
and (14) are equivalent. Let λ≥ 0, ψu  0, and ψv  0 be the Lagrange multipliers of the three constraints
9in (6), respectively, the KKT conditions of (7) is
Θ1 =S∗u = A(S∗u,S∗v)−λInT +ψuT = 0, (15)
Θ2 =S∗v = A(S∗u,S∗v)−
hhH
1+hHS∗vh
+E
[
ggH
1+gHS∗vg
]
−λInT +ψvT = 0, (16)
ψuS∗u =S∗uψu = 0, (17)
ψvS∗v =S∗vψv = 0, (18)
tr(S∗u +S∗v)≤PT , S∗u  0, S∗v  0, (19)
where
A(S∗u,S∗v), aaH +M, (20)
aaH ,
hhH
1+hH (S∗u +S∗v)h
, (21)
M,−E
[
ggH
1+gH (S∗u +S∗v)g
]
, (22)
and S∗u and S∗v are the optimal input covariance matrices of u and v, respectively. In the following we
denote A(S∗u,Sv) by A∗ to simplify the notation. After left and right multiplying (15) by (S∗u)T , with
(17), we have the relation A∗(Su∗)T = (Su∗)T A∗ = λ(S∗u)T , where λ =
tr(A∗(Su∗)T )
tr((Su∗)T ) . Then we can apply
[13, Lemma 8] to ensure λ > 0, if R > 0. Since A∗ and (S∗u)T commute, they have the same eigenvectors.
Therefore, we have
ΛA∗ΛS∗u = ΛS∗uΛA∗ = λΛS∗u, (23)
where ΛA∗ and ΛS∗u are the eigenvalue matrices of A
∗ and S∗u, respectively. Due to M in (20) is a negative-
definite matrix [13, Lemma4], from Lemma 3, we know that all eigenvalues of A∗ are smaller to zero
except for the largest one. This can be explained as following. By using Lemma 3 and letting k = nT −2
in (13), we have λnT−1(A∗)≤ λnT (M). Note that M is a negative definite matrix, i.e., λnT (M)< 0. So we
have λi(A∗)< 0 for i = 1,2, . . . ,nT −1. Since λ is positive, from (23) we know that it must be the largest
eigenvalue of A∗, i.e. λ = λnT (A∗). In order to make the equality ΛA∗ΛS∗u = λΛS∗u valid, the eigenvalues
of S∗u corresponding to non-positive eigenvalues of A∗ must be all zeros. Therefore, we obtain that S∗u
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has only one nonzero eigenvalue. So the covariance matrix of S∗u is rank one if R > 0. Then with Lemma
2, we conclude the proof.
In the following we prove an important property, that is, using all the power is optimal for the proposed
AN scheme.
Lemma 4: To maximize (7), the sum power constraint in (6) is hold with equality.
Proof: Similar to Theorem 2, the key observation here is that with the selection of eigenvectors of
signal and AN in Lemma 2, the first term on the RHS of (10) is independent of the power of AN in the
null space of the legitimate channel. Thus to find PVi for i = 2,3, . . . ,nT given PU and PV1 , the objective
function becomes
min
PV2 ···PVnT
E

log

1+ ˜G1PU
1+ ˜G1PV1 +
nT∑
i=2
˜GiPVi



 . (24)
From (24) it can be easily seen that given PU and PV1 , the value of the objective function decreases with
increasing PT . Thus we may change the first inequality constraint in (6) as an equality one.
Based on Lemma 2 and 4, we have the following property for AN.
Lemma 5: For the optimization problem (7), the optimal covariance matrix of AN is
Sv∗ =
1
nT −1
(
nT PV1 −PT +PU
||h||2
hhH +(PT −PU −PV1)I
)
.
Proof: To proceed, we transform (24) as
max
PV2 ···PVnT
E
[
log
(
1+ ˜G1PV1 +
nT∑
i=2
˜GiPVi
)
− log
(
1+ ˜G1(PU +PV1)+
nT∑
i=2
˜GiPVi
)]
= max
PV2 ···PVnT
E
˜G1
[
f (x)
∣∣∣ ˜G1] ,
(25)
where the equality comes from the conditional mean, f (x) , E [log(a+ x)− log(b+ x)] and we denote
1+ ˜G1PV1 , 1+ ˜G1(PU +PV1), and
nT∑
i=2
˜GiPVi by a, b, and x, respectively. If given ˜G1 = g1, ∀g1, the optimal
power allocation of f (x) is PV2 =PV3 = · · ·=PVnT , then for the problem on the left hand side (LHS) of (25),
this power allocation is also optimal. This is due to the fact that ˜Gi is unknown at transmitter by whom can
not be used to change the power allocation. Therefore, we want to prove that under
nT∑
i=2
PVi = PT −PU −PV1
f
(
PT −PU −PV1
nT −1
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi
)
≥ f
(
nT∑
i=2
˜GiPVi
)
, ∀PVi , i = 2, · · · , nT . (26)
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Here we introduce some results from the stochastic ordering theory [16] to prove the desired result.
Definition 2: [16, p.234] A function ψ : [0,∞)→ R is completely monotone if for all x > 0 and
n = 0,1,2, · · · , its derivative ψ(n) exists and (−1)nψ(n)(x)≥ 0.
Definition 3: [16, (5.A.1)] Let B1 and B2 be two nonnegative random variables such that E[e−sB1] ≥
E[e−sB2], for all s > 0. Then B1 is said to be smaller than B2 in the Laplace transform order, denoted as
B1 ≤LT B2.
Lemma 6: [16, Th. 5.A.4] Let B1 and B2 be two nonnegative random variables. If B1 ≤LT B2 then
E[ f (B1)] ≤ E[ f (B2)], where the first derivative ψ of a differentiable function f on [0,∞) is completely
monotone, provided that the expectations exist.
To prove (26), we let B1 =
nT∑
i=2
˜GiPVi , B2 =
nT∑
i=2
˜GiP∗Vi to invoke Lemma 6, where P
∗
Vi denotes the optimal
value of PVi . It can be easily verified that ψ(x), the first derivative of f (x), satisfies Definition 2. More
specifically, the nth derivative of ψ meets
ψ(n)(x) =


n!
(a+x)n+1
− n!
(b+x)n+1 > 0, if n is even,
−n!
(a+x)n+1
+ n!
(b+x)n+1 < 0, if n is odd,
(27)
when x > 0, since by definition, b > a > 0 when R > 0. Now from Lemma 6 and Definition 3, we know
that to prove (26) is equivalent to proving E[e−sB1]≥E[e−sB2] or log(E[e−sB1]/E[e−sB2])≥ 0, ∀s > 0. From
[17, p.40], we know that
log
(
E[e−sB1 ]
E[e−sB2 ]
)
=
nT∑
k=2
log(1+2P∗Vks)−
nT∑
k=2
log(1+2PVks). (28)
To show the above is nonnegative, we resort to the majorization theory [18]. Note that ∑nTk=2 log(1+2 ˇPVks)
is a Schur-concave function in ( ˇPV2, . . . , ˇPVnT ), ∀s > 0, and by the definition of majorization
(P∗V2, · · · ,P
∗
VnT
) =
(
PT −PU −PV1
nT −1
,
PT −PU −PV1
nT −1
, · · · ,
PT −PU −PV1
nT −1
)
≺ (PV2, · · · ,PVnT ),
we know that the RHS of (28) is nonnegative, ∀s > 0. Then (26) is valid. From Lemma 2 and 5, we can
conclude that
S∗v =
[
h/||h||, h⊥/||h||
]
diag
(
PV1,
PT −PU −PV1
nT −1
, · · · ,
PT −PU −PV1
nT −1
)[
h/||h||, h⊥/||h||
]H
. (29)
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Then with the expansion
hhH
||h||2
+
h⊥(h⊥)H
||h||2
= I,
we conclude the proof.
After substituting the S∗u from Theorem 2 and S∗v from Lemma 5 into (7), we can get (8). Note that
when the main channel is fast faded but perfectly known at transmitter, as [12], the achievable secrecy
rate for this setting can be easily obtained from results in Theorem 1.
IV. THE ITERATIVE ALGORITHM FOR POWER ALLOCATIONS BETWEEN SIGNAL AND
GENERALIZED ARTIFICIAL NOISE
Although we have simplified the optimization problem in (7) to (8), since (8) is a non-convex stochastic
optimization problem, it is still difficult to analytically solve the optimal power allocation PU , PV1 , and
PV2 in (8). Thus in this section we propose an iterative power allocation algorithm summarized in Table
I, which can find solutions almost the same as the brute-force search. However, the complexity of the
proposed algorithm is much lower than the one based on brute-force search. More specifically, the brute
force search requires searching on a plane for the three variables PU , PV1 , and PV2 , simultaneously. However,
the proposed algorithm divide the search into two sub-problems which costs much less complexity. Before
introducing the iterative algorithm, we first provide a necessary condition in Theorem (3) for the optimal
covariance matrix S∗v of the GAN to be full rank. This condition will be useful to test the correctness of
power allocation found in proposed algorithm.
First define
Fk (x) =
∫
∞
0
xe−t
(1+ xt)k
dt = e1/xEk (1/x) ,
where Ek(x) is the En-function [19].
Then we have the necessary condition in the following.
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Theorem 3: The necessary condition for the power allocation (PU ,PV1,PV2) to be optimal for (8) is
1
1+ ||h||2PV1
−
1+ ||h||2PU
1+ ||h||2(PU +PV1)
+
(
1+
PV2
PV1
)
A1F1(PV1)+A2F2(PV1)
+
(
nT −1+
PV1
PV2
) nT∑
k=1
Bk
PV2
Fk(PV2)−
PV1
PV2
BnT FnT (PV2)− (PV1 +(nT −1)PV2)
A′1
PU +PV1
F1(PU +PV1)
−
PV1A
′
2
PU +PV1
F2(PU +PV1)−
(
nT −1+
PV1
PV2
) nT∑
k=1
B
′
kFk(PV2)+
PV1
PV2
B
′
nT FnT (PV2)≷ 0, (30)
then
(
A1
PV1
F1(PV1)+
A2
PV1
F2(PV1)
)
+
nT−1∑
k=1
Bk
PV2
Fk(PV2)−
A′1
PU +PV1
F1(PU +PV1)−
A′2
PU +PV1
F2(PU +PV1)
−
nT−1∑
k=1
B′k
PV2
Fk(PV2)≷
||h||4 PU(
1+ ||h||2 PV1
)(
1+ ||h||2 (PU +PV1)
) , (31)
where
A1 =
1−nT(
1− PV2PV1
)nT PV2PV1 , A2 =
1(
1− PV2PV1
)nT−1 , Bk =
(nT − k)
(
−
PV1
PV2
)nT−1−k
(
1− PV2PV1
)nT−k+1 ,
A
′
1 =
1−nT(
1− PV2PU+PV1
)nT PU +PV1PV2 , A
′
2 =
1(
1− PV2PU+PV1
)nT−1 , B′k =
(nT − k)
(
−
PU+PV1
PV2
)nT−1−k
(
1− PV2PU+PV1
)nT−k+1 , (32)
with the requirement PV1 > 0.
Now we present the derivation for the proposed iterative algorithm. The key idea of the proposed
algorithm is as following. To prevent the high complexity of simultaneously solving PU , PV1 , and PV2 ,
we try to divide the problem as smaller ones and we can simply use bisection method to solve them.
More specifically, we start from the KKT conditions, by eliminating the Lagrange multipliers, we form
two equations each has different variables to solve. Then iteratively solve these two equations, we can
find the power allocation. With the Lagrange multipliers λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0, and µ2 ≥ 0, by the KKT
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conditions of (8), we then have
g1 ,
||h||2
1+ ||h||2 (P∗U +P∗V1)
−E

 ˜G1
1+(P∗U +P∗V1) ˜G1 +PV2
nT
∑
i=2
˜Gi

−λ+µ = 0, (33)
g2 ,
||h||2
1+ ||h||2 (P∗U +P∗V1)
−
||h||2
1+ ||h||2 P∗V1
−E

 ˜G1
1+(P∗U +P∗V1) ˜G1 +PV2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

+E

 ˜G1
1+P∗V1 ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

−λ+µ1 = 0, (34)
g3 ,−E


nT
∑
i=2
˜Gi
1+(P∗U +P∗V1) ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

+E


nT
∑
i=2
˜Gi
1+P∗V1 ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

− (nT −1)λ+µ2 = 0, (35)
µP∗U =0, (36)
µ1P∗V1 =0, (37)
µ2P∗V2 =0. (38)
Assume that P∗U , P∗V1 , and P
∗
V2 are all non-zeros. Combining (33), (34), (36), and (37) we have
f1(P∗V1,P∗V2),
P∗U P∗V1g1−P
∗
U P∗V1g2
P∗U P∗V1
=
||h||2
1+ ||h||2 P∗V1
−E

 ˜G1
1+P∗V1 ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

= 0. (39)
Similarly, combining (33), (35), (36), and (38), and using the fact that
E


nT∑
i=2
˜Gi
1+P∗V1 ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

= (nT −1)E

 ˜G2
1+P∗V1 ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

 , (40)
since the channel gain of each antenna is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we have
f2(P∗U ,P∗V1,P∗V2),
P∗U P∗V2g1−P
∗
U P∗V2
1
nT−1g3
P∗U P∗V2
=
||h||2
1+ ||h||2 (P∗U +P∗V1)
−E

 ˜G1
1+(P∗U +P∗V1) ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi


+E

 ˜G2
1+(P∗U +P∗V1) ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

−E

 ˜G2
1+P∗V1 ˜G1 +P
∗
V2
nT∑
i=2
˜Gi

= 0. (41)
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Now for the ith iteration, with a given P(i)V1 , we can find new (PU ,PV2) such that f2(PU ,P
(i)
V1 ,PV2) = 0
according to (41). We can set PU = (PT −PV2 −P(i)V1 )/(nT − 1) then f2(PU ,PV1 ,PV2) becomes a function
with only one variable PV2 . We let the resulted PV2 as P
(i+1)
V2 . Then with a given P
(i+1)
V2 , we can numerically
solve a new PV1 such that f1(PV1,P(i+1)V2 )=0 according to (39). We let the resulted PV1 as P
(i+1)
V1 and the
iterative algorithm follows. The bisection method can be used to perform the numerical search.
Based on the concept described above, we explain each step in Table I in detail. First, numerically
finding the tuple (PV1 ,PV2,PU) which exactly meet the equality (39) (or (41)) is very hard. Therefore we
relax (39) and (41) by inequalities
| f1(PV1,PV2)|< ε1 and | f2(PU ,PV1,PV2)|< ε1, (42)
respectively, where ε1 is a small constant. Once the values from the bisection search validate the above
inequalities, they are treated as the solutions of these inequalities. Together with the iteration step described
in the end of the previous paragraph, we obtain Step 2 and 3 in Table I. Second, relaxing equalities (39) and
(41) to inequalities (42) make solutions obtained depend on ε1 and may not satisfy the KKT conditions.
Also the expectations in functions f1 and f2 ((39) and (41)) are calculated numerically via generation
of the channel realizations. Thus as in Step 4 of Table I, we use the analytical results in Theorem 3 to
verify the correctness of the solutions. Finally, the initial values for the first iteration in Step 1 are as
follows. Note that two initial values are needed for specifying the search region of the bisection method.
For initializing Step 2, the two initial values for PU are 0 and PT −P(i)V1 , such that the corresponding values
of function f2 will have opposite signs. And there exists at least one solution in the interval [0,PT −P(i)V1 ].
By the same reason, for initializing Step 3, the two initial values for P(i)V1 are 0 and PT −PV2(nT −1). In
the ith iteration, the search regions are [0,PT −P(i)V1 ] and [0,PT − (nT −1)P
(i)
V2 ] for f2 and f1, respectively.
However, the bisection method may not always work for searching solutions for | f2|< ε1 in Step 2 of
Table I. Note that for the initial value PU = PT −P(i)V1 , f2(PT −P
(i)
V1 ,P
(i)
V1 ,0) < 0 given P
(i)
V1 . On the other
hand, given P(i)V1 , there exist two cases for f2 at initial value PU = 0: one is that f2(0,P
(i)
V1 ,P
(i)
V2 ) < 0 as
depicted in Figure 2 (a), and the other is f2(0,P(i)V1 ,P
(i)
V2 )> 0 as depicted in Figure 2 (b). In the later case,
the bisection method works. However, if the former case happens, the function values have the same sign,
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and the bisection method does not work. To solve this problem, we can use the golden section method
[20], which is a technique for finding the maximum in the interval [0,PT −P(i)V1 ], i.e., to numerically find
˜PU first such that given P
(i)
V1 , f2( ˜PU ,P
(i)
V1 ,P
(i)
V2 ) is positive. After that we can follow the step 2 in Table I
to solve PU in the interval [ ˜PU ,PT −P(i)V1 ]. If the maximum of f2(PU ,P
(i)
V1 ,P
(i)
V2 ) in the interval [0,PT −P
(i)
V1 ]
is still negative, we know that there does not exist any PU in this interval such that f2(PU ,P(i)V1 ,P
(i)
V2 ) = 0
given P(i)V1 . In this case, we set PU = 0 as the solution of f2(PU ,P
(i)
V1 ,P
(i)
V2 ) = 0 given P
(i)
V1 . From simulation
results, according to the iterative algorithm in Table I, the power P(i)U , P
(i)
V1 , and P
(i)
V2 will converge to the
optimal solution P∗U , P∗V1 , and P
∗
V2 , respectively, which satisfy the KKT necessary conditions.
Remark 1: Note that in Section IV we assume that PU , PV1,and PV2 are all non-zeros to eliminate the
multipliers. For channel conditions under which low rank AN covariance matrix is optimal, the proposed
algorithm may have PV1 converge to a value approximately zero. When this value is smaller than a
predefined threshold ε2, we claim that PV1 = 0 is optimal.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the performance gain of the proposed transmission scheme over Goel and
Negi’s scheme. We use a 2 by 1 by 1 channel as an example. Assume that the noise variances of Bob
and Eve are normalized to 1. From (8) we know that the rate RGAN only depends on the norm of the
main channel. Therefore, we use ||h||2 = 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2 to indicate different channel conditions in
the simulation. For the statistics of the eavesdropper’s channel, we set E[ ˜G1] = E[ ˜G2] = 1. In Fig. 3, 4,
and 5, which correspond to ||h||2 = 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2, respectively, we compare the rates of Goel and
Negi’s scheme to that of our proposed signaling with the generalized AN. The blue and black curves
represent searching the optimal power allocations exhaustively and by the proposed iterative algorithm,
respectively. In the iterative algorithm, we set the iteration number MAXIT as 20, MAXCheck as 5, and
ε1 = ε2 = 10−5. From Fig. 3, 4, and 5, we can easily see that the proposed generalized AN scheme indeed
provides apparent rate gains over Goel and Negi’s scheme in the moderate SNR regions. In addition, we
can observe that the rate gains decrease with increasing ||h||2, which is consistent with the results in [12].
We can also find that the value of PT which provides the largest rate gain also decreases with increasing
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||h||2. This is because AN in the signal direction provides much more rate gains when Bob’s received
SNR is relatively small compared to Eve’s. Furthermore, the power allocations of the proposed iterative
algorithm indeed converges to those by exhaustive search. In and Fig. 6 we show the convergence rate of
the proposed algorithm under ||h||2 = 0.1 with different PT . It can be found that the proposed algorithm
converges fast under different PT , i.e., it costs at most 7 iterations to the final value, which verifies the
complexity of solving the power allocation is much lower than the full search.
As another example, we also illustrate the optimal power allocation among PU , PV1 , and PV2 under
||h||2 = 0.05 in Fig. 7. It can be easily seen that as the received SNR increases, the power allocated to
PV1 decreases and the rate gain over Goel and Negi’s scheme also decreases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we generalized Goel and Negi’s artificial noise (AN) for fast fading secure transmission
with full knowledge of the main channel and only the statistics of the eavesdropper’s channel state
information at the transmitter. Instead of transmitting AN in the null space of the legitimate channel, we
considered injecting AN in all directions, including the direction for conveying the dedicated messages.
Our main result provides a highly simplified power allocation problem to describe the ergodic secrecy rate.
To attain it, we proved that for a multiple-input single-output single-antenna-eavesdropper system with
the proposed AN injecting scheme, the optimal transmission scheme is a beamformer which is aligned to
the direction of the legitimate channel. In addition, we provided the necessary condition for the optimal
covariance matrix of AN to be full rank. After characterizing the optimal eigenvectors of the covariance
matrices of signal and AN, we also developed an algorithm to efficiently solve the non-convex power
allocation problem. Through simulations, we verified that the proposed scheme outperforms Goel and
Negi’s AN scheme under certain channel conditions, especially when the legitimate channel is poor.
VII. APPENDIX
Before proving Theorem 3, we first introduce the following lemma which will be used.
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Lemma 7: Given D1 ≻ D2,
Y, E
[
ggH
1+gHDH2 g
]
−E
[
ggH
1+gHDH1 g
]
≻ 0. (43)
Proof: We first write the expectation in (43) in the following integral,
Y1,1 =
∫
∞
0
e−t
1
(1+PV1t)
2
1
(1+PV2t)
nT−1
dt−
∫
∞
0
e−t
1
(1+(PU +PV1) t)
2
1
(1+PV2t)
nT−1
dt
=
∫
∞
0
e−t
(
1
(1+PV1t)
2 −
1
(1+(PU +PV1) t)
2
)
1
(1+PV2t)
nT−1
dt > 0, (44)
and
Yi,i =
∫
∞
0
e−t
1
1+PV1t
1
(1+PV2t)
nT dt−
∫
∞
0
e−t
1
1+(PU +PV1) t
1
(1+PV2t)
nT dt
=
∫
∞
0
e−t
(
1
1+PV1t
−
1
1+(PU +PV1) t
)
1
(1+PV2t)
nT dt > 0, (45)
for i = 2,3, . . . ,nT , and from [13, Lemma 4], we know that the non-diagonal entries of both the first and
second terms of Y in (7) are zeros, then Yi, j = 0 for i 6= j. Therefore, we know that Y is a diagonal
matrix and each diagonal entry from (44) and (45) is larger than zero, which completes the proof.
We now provide the proof of Theorem 3
Proof: We first rearrange (16) as
Θ2 = C−λInT +ψTv = 0,
where
C,UYUH − ccH , (46)
Y,E
[
UHggHU
1+gHUD2UHg
]
−E
[
UHggHU
1+gHUD1UHg
]
= E
[
ggH
1+gHDH2 g
]
−E
[
ggH
1+gHDH1 g
]
, (47)
c,
(
hHSuh
(1+hHS∗vh)(1+hH (Su +S∗v)h)
)1/2
h. (48)
Similar to (23), we have
ΛCΛS∗v = ΛS∗vΛC = tr(CS
∗
v)ΛS∗v. (49)
And we know that the necessary condition for the optimal AN to be full rank is that when tr(CS∗v)> 0, C
does not have any negative eigenvalues; or, when tr(CS∗v)< 0, C does not have any positive eigenvalues.
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To verify this property, we resort to the fact from [13, Lemma 5] that if all eigenvalues λ of aaH −A are
negative, then l(0)> 0, where l(λ) is defined as,
l(λ), 1−aH (A+λInT )−1 a, (50)
and A≻ 0. Note that l(λ) is a strictly increasing function when λ > 0. Note also that C in (46) is negated
of aaH −A. Thus all eigenvalues of C are positive implies l(0)> 0. Thus by substituting c and UYUH
into a and A, respectively, we have
l(λ) = 1− cH
(
UYUH +λInT
)−1
c. (51)
By Lemma 7 we know
(
UYUH
)−1
exists. Then we can expand l(0)> 0 from (51) as
1 > cH
(
UYUH
)−1
c. (52)
Then after substituting c from (48) to (52), and using Theorem 2 and Lemma 2, we have
[
Y−1
]
1,1 <
(
1+ ||h||2 PV1
)(
1+ ||h||2 (PU +PV1)
)
||h||4 PU
.
From [13, Lemma 4] we know that Y is diagonal. In addition, with Y is invertible from the proof of
Lemma 7, we can further rearrange the above as
[Y]1,1 >
||h||4 PU(
1+ ||h||2 PV1
)(
1+ ||h||2 (PU +PV1)
) .
Then by the definition of Y in (47), and the fractional expansion, we can further express the above as(
A1
PV1
F1(PV1)+
A2
PV1
F2(PV1)
)
1PV1 6=0 +
nT−1∑
k=1
Bk
PV2
Fk(PV2)−
A′1
PU +PV1
F1(PU +PV1)−
A′2
PU +PV1
F2(PU +PV1)
−
nT−1∑
k=1
B′k
PV2
Fk(PV2)>
||h||4 PU(
1+ ||h||2 PV1
)(
1+ ||h||2 (PU +PV1)
) , (53)
where A1, A2, A′1, A′2, Bk, and B′k for k = 1,2, . . . ,nT −1 are defined in the statement of the theorem. In
addition, tr(CS∗v)> 0 implies
1
1+ ||h||2PV1
−
1+ ||h||2PU
1+ ||h||2(PU +PV1)
+E
[
1+gH(D1−D2)g
1+gHD1g
]
−E
[
1
1+gHD2g
]
> 0. (54)
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After some arrangement, (54) can be further represented by
1
1+ ||h||2PV1
−
1+ ||h||2PU
1+ ||h||2(PU +PV1)
+
(
1+ PV2
PV1
)
A1F1(PV1)+A2F2(PV1)+
(
nT −1+
PV1
PV2
) nT∑
k=1
Bk
PV2
Fk(PV2)
−
PV1
PV2
BnT FnT (PV2)− (PV1 +(nT −1)PV2)
A′1
PU +PV1
F1(PU +PV1)−
PV1A
′
2
PU +PV1
F2(PU +PV1)
−
(
nT −1+
PV1
PV2
) nT∑
k=1
B
′
kFk(PV2)+
PV1
PV2
B
′
nT FnT (PV2)> 0. (55)
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TABLE I
THE ITERATIVE ALGORITHM FOR POWER ALLOCATION BETWEEN SIGNAL AND GENERALIZED AN
Step 1 Set i = 0, P(0)V1 = 0, and initialize search region for the bisection method.
Step 2 Given P(i)V1 and the total power constraint (6), find PV2 (and thus PU = (PT −PV2 −P
(i)
V1 )/(nT −1))
such that | f2(PU ,P(i)V1 ,PV2)|< ε1, where f2 is defined in (41).
Set P(i+1)V2 = PV2
Step 3 Given P(i+1)V2 and the total power constraint (6), find PV1
such that | f1(PV1 ,P(i+1)V2 )|< ε1, where f1 is defined in (39)
Set P(i+1)V1 = PV1 .
Step 4 Let i = i+1 and repeat Step 2 to Step 3 until MAXIT .
Step 5 Check the whether the final power allocations meet Theorem 3.
If not, randomly re-initialize P(0)V1 and run Step 1-4 until MAXCheck.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus transmit power under ||h||2 = 0.05.
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27
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Number of iterations
se
cr
e
cy
 ra
te
 (b
its
/ch
an
ne
l u
se
)
||h||2=0.1
 
 
PT=20
PT=25
PT=30
PT=35
Fig. 6. Secrecy rate versus the number of iteration under ||h||2 = 0.1.
28
40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Transmit power PT
O
pt
im
al
 p
ow
er
 a
llc
at
io
n 
ra
tio
||h||2=0.05
 
 
PU
PV
1
PV
2
Fig. 7. Power allocation among PU , PV1 , and PV2 under ||h||2 = 0.05.
